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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Thomas Moffat asserts that the district court erred in allowing the State to pursue
a second prosecution for attempted strangulation as the underlying acts only constituted
a single course of conduct, for which he had already been convicted of domestic
battery. That second prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional rights to
be free from double jeopardy. The State contended, after breaking down the composite
acts underlying the charged offenses, that double jeopardy did not prohibit the dual
prosecutions in this case.
Supreme Court.

That perspective has been rejected by the United States

The proper focus of double jeopardy analysis is on the offenses

charged.
In this case, Mr. Moffat's actions constituted but one, continuous course of
conduct. There are two offenses alleged from that single course of conduct. Under the
first alternative test of double jeopardy violations, the pleading test, that is impermissible
under the Idaho Constitution.

Additionally, the two statutes which were invoked to

define those offenses are not bilaterally unique, particularly in this case where the state
and the district court admit the overlap based on these facts.

Therefore, under the

second alternative test of double jeopardy violations, the statutory test, the dual
prosecutions are impermissible under both the state and federal constitutions.
Therefore, because the second prosecution for attempted strangulation violated
Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy, this
Court should reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss and vacate
Mr. Moffat's conviction for attempted strangulation.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Moffat's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss because the
second prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from
double jeopardy.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Moffat's Motion To Dismiss Because The
Second Prosecution Violated His State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Be Free
From Double Jeopardy
A.

Introduction
In Idaho, there are multiple tests regarding the state and federal constitutional

protections against double jeopardy, and failing to satisfy anyone of them results in
a violation of those constitutional protections. 1

See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 101

Idaho 430, 435 n.5 (1980); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 530-31 (2011);
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374 (Ct. App. 2011).

In this case, the dual

prosecutions of Mr. Moffat for the same course of conduct violate those constitutional
protections.

The State's argument to the contrary - that the composite facts of the

alleged offenses can be broken apart so as to permit the dual prosecutions - is
erroneous.
The Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be ... subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).

Article I, § 13 of the Idaho constitution

provides at least coextensive protections to the Fifth Amendment.

State v. McKeeth,

136 Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001); but see Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5
(recognizing that Idaho provides broader protections in some situations via its pleadings

Along with the two recognized tests (the pleading theory (see Thompson, 101 Idaho
430) and the statutory theory (see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)),
the district court identified a third, hybrid (or elements) theory. (See R., p.97.) That test
has not been officially recognized, but combines aspects of the other two tests.
See, e.g., State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374 (Ct. App. 2011); Sivak v. State, 112
Idaho 197, 211 (1986). As such, it is necessarily discussed simultaneously with the
other tests.
1
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test). In this case, the prosecution for attempted strangulation is a second prosecution
for the same course of conduct (the incident which occurred on May 9, 2010) as the
misdemeanor domestic battery charge to which Mr. Moffat had already entered a guilty
plea. (R., pp.34, 36, 71, 79.) As such, the prosecution for attempted strangulation was
for the same offense as the misdemeanor domestic battery, and thus, as the second
prosecution for that offense, the prosecution for the attempted strangulation violated
Mr. Moffat's constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy under all of the tests.
The State erroneously contends that it is permissible to break the offense down
and analyze it for double jeopardy violations based solely on its composite acts:
"[Mr.] Moffat has not shown that his conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery was
not based on acts other than his grabbing Ms. Nelson's throat .... [Mr.] Moffat has
failed to show that his attempted strangulation charge, to which he pled guilty, was
predicated on the same act of his grabbing Ms. Nelson by the throat .... " (Resp.
Br., pp.10-11.)

That perspective has been rejected by the United States Supreme

Court:
[T]he Ohio Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that Nathaniel Brown
could be convicted of both crimes because the charges against him
focused on different parts of his 9-day joyride. App. 23. We hold a different
view. The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that

prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a
single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (emphasis added).

As the United States

Supreme Court has already rejected the State's arguments, this Court should also
reject them.

See id.

The proper analysis is focused on the offenses charged, and

under any of the tests available in Idaho, these two prosecutions violate Mr. Moffat's
constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
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B.

Under Idaho's Pleading Test For Double Jeopardy Violations, The Second
Prosecution For Attempted Strangulation Is Unconstitutional Because The
Pleadings Allege Two Violations For The Same Course Of Conduct
Regardless of this Court's conclusion in regard to the Blockburgertest (which will

be discussed infra), the second prosecution of Mr. Moffat (for attempted strangulation)
is unconstitutional under Idaho's independent pleading test. That test, recognized by
the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, provides independent protection from
double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435, n.5. The

Thompson test looks to the pleadings themselves to determine whether the State is
charging multiple offenses for one course of conduct.

Id. at 435-36.

If the second

prosecution fails to pass muster under Thompson's pleadings test, then the prosecution
is invalid, regardless of the result of the Blockburger analysis. Thompson, 101 Idaho at
435 n.5; see also Flegel, 151 Idaho at 539-31.

Basically, if one offense is but the

means or method of the other, there cannot be two prosecutions. C.f. Flegel, 151 Idaho
at 529.
A proper review under the pleading theory requires the courts to look at the two
charging documents. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530. Where "[t]he acts comprising a violation
of [one statute] as set forth and alleged in the Amended Information are the same acts
with which [the defendant] was charged in the original complaint and original
Information alleging a violation of [the other statute,]" that would indicate that there was
one course of conduct, that the offenses are included within one another, and that
separate prosecutions are unconstitutional. See id. (quoting State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho
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244, 249 (1990)).2 Therefore, in a situation where the two charging documents allege
two violations arising from the same course of conduct or same acts, the pleading
theory bars the second, independent prosecution. Id.
In Mr. Moffat's case, the testimony of both the victim and the officer establish that
there was but one course of conduct. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1, p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9 (Officer
Tolman testifying that the domestic battery charge was for the entire course of conduct
which occurred on May 9, 2010); Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.2 (according to Ms. Stone, an independent witness, "it appeared to her as if the male
subject was holding the female subject by her hair and in the area of her throat with the
other hand"); Prelim. Tr., p.12 (Ms. Nelson, the victim, testifying that "he grabbed her by
her hair with one hand and grabbed her around her throat with his other hand" as the
correct version of events).) Officer Tolman's testimony is particularly telling in this case:
In interviewing [Ms. Nelson], were there any physical marks or injury
that you observed on her?
A. She had scrape marks on her nose. I believe she had scrape marks
on her back, and she did have some finger-type marks on her neck that I
could distinguish.
Q. And when you went about completing the investigation, you issued a
citation?
A. I did, for Domestic Battery.
Q. And that citation was issued for -- what type of Domestic Battery?
A. Just simple domestic. We just call it simple Battery. The elements
didn't amount to any type of felony domestic where there was no serious
injury or great bodily harm.
Q.

2 Of particular note is the fact that multiple "acts" (note the plural) may compromise the
violation, and it is the charged violation which is scrutinized, not those composite acts.
See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530; O'Neill, 118 Idaho at 249. This demonstrates the
erroneous nature of the State's contention that this Court should only review the
composite acts. (See Resp. Br. at 8-13.)
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(Tr., Vol. 1, p.24, L.17 - p.25, L.g (emphasis added).) In fact, the district court found "[i]n
particular, it was determined that the victim had scrape marks on her back, knees, and
neck, as well as red marks on her neck. Based upon those findings, Detective Tolman
charged the Defendant with misdemeanor domestic battery." (R., p.96 (emphasis
added).)

That finding of fact, unchallenged by the State, demonstrates that the

domestic battery charge included the grabbing of Ms. Nelson's throat (i.e., the act of
choking or attempted strangulation), and thus, that there was but one, continuous
course of conduct.
Despite the fact that the course of events was continuous, the State prosecuted
that course of conduct as the violation of two separate statutes. The domestic battery
offense, charged by citation, asserts that, on or about May 9, 2010, Mr. Moffat
committed domestic battery in violation of I. C. § 18-918(3)(b) against Ms. Nelson, by
using force against her, touching her against her will, or causing her bodily harm,
evidenced by the marks on her knees, back, and neck. (R., pp.71-73.) The attempted
strangulation offense, charged by information, asserts that on or about May 9, 2010,
Mr. Moffat committed attempted strangulation in violation of I.C. § 18-923(1) against
Ms. Neslon by unlawfully choking or attempting to strangle her. 3

(R., p.36.)

Thus,

based on the charging documents, the same course of conduct was charged as
violations of two separate statutes and prosecuted in two separate cases.

(See

3 As the State correctly points out, this can only be accomplished by using force about
or causing injury to the victim's neck. (See Resp. Br. at p.9 n.6.) Additionally, as the
prosecutor admitted below, the act of grabbing Ms. Nelson by the neck "could be a
misdemeanor Domestic Battery." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.36, Ls.6-10.) As such, the facts reveal
that Officer Tolman included the forceful touching of Ms. Nelson's neck (evidenced by
the red finger marks thereon) in the domestic battery, and that same act was also the
basis for the attempted strangulation charge.

8

R., pp.36, 71-73.)

'There is no separate event upon which to base the additional

charge." Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 (emphasis added). Rather, Mr. Moffat's actions
constituted a "continuous 'act'" and cannot be subjected to multiple punishments.
See, e.g., State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 569 (Ct. App. 1984).

Such dual

prosecutions violate the Idaho Constitution's protection against double jeopardy.4 See,
e.g., Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530.
Furthermore, they allege a crime which is but the means or method by which a
second crime was committed, which also demonstrates a violation of the Idaho
Constitution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435-36. The question is not whether the
two charges could be committed in a manner other than was charged; the question is
whether the offenses as charged are for the same course of conduct. Thompson, 101
Idaho at 433, 435. In this case, as charged, the dual prosecutions are for the same
course of conduct - the incident which occurred on May 9, 2010. (See R., pp.36, 7173.) Therefore, the dual prosecutions violate the Idaho Constitution's protection against
double jeopardy. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530.

4 It would be no more permissible for the State to prosecute a defendant in two separate
prosecutions for two charges of battery, one for each punch that he threw during the
course of a brawl. See, e.g., Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530. Similarly, it is inappropriate to
pursue two prosecutions, one for attempted robbery (accomplished through use of a
shotgun) and another for assault with a deadly weapon (accomplished through the use
of that same shotgun), even though the composite acts underlying those charges were
distinct from one another. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436 (rejecting the State's argument
that there were actually two separate acts: the initial attempt to enter the home
(attempted robbery) and the firing of the shotgun at the door (assault with a deadly
weapon)).
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C.

Under The Federal Blockburger Test For Double Jeopardy Violations, The
Second Prosecution For Attempted Strangulation Is Unconstitutional Because
There Is No Bilateral Uniqueness Between The Statutes Under Which Mr. Moffat
Was Charged
The Blockburger rule is succinctly stated: "where the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.,,5 State v. Osweiler, 140

5 As indicated by both the Blockburger and Os weiler Courts, the composite facts are not
irrelevant to a determination regarding double jeopardy protections; they just are not the
focus of the analysis. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301; Os weiler, 140 Idaho at 826. For
example, when considering the implications of double jeopardy in regard to charges of
burglary and rape, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the facts of the case, but it did
so by focusing on the elements established in the statute, examining the statutes for
bilateral uniqueness:
As defined, the crime of burglary is complete when there is an entry with
the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony. Thus, if the
burglar who enters with the intent to commit a specific felony abandons or
fails to perform that felony, he will still be guilty of burglary. We find that
neither rape nor burglary is a lesser included offense of the other. The
burglary was complete when McCormick entered the victim's residence
with the intent to commit rape, whereas the rape was not committed until
there was an act of sexual intercourse under the circumstances described
in I.C. §18-6101.
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114-15 (1979) (citations omitted). Similarly, the
Legislature may decide that certain conduct should be penalized twice. See, e.g.,
State v. Bryan, 145 Idaho 612, 616 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359, 368 (1983). However, such a procedure is permissible only where the dual
prosecution of the redundant charges is "combined in a single trial." Hunter, 459 U.S. at
368; Bryan, 145 Idaho at 616. Because the prosecutions against Mr. Moffat were not
consolidated in a single trial, this limitation to the Blockburger analysis is inapplicable in
his case.
Additionally, the Legislature's Statement of Purpose in regard to I.C. §18-923's
criminalization of attempted strangulation reveals that it did not authorize cumulative
punishment for the same act, which is another reason the Hunter exception is
inapplicable: "This statute is intended specifically to permit the prosecution of attempted
strangulation where no visible injury is present .... " 2005 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 303
(S.8. 1062) (emphasis added). As such, the Legislature did not authorize cumulative
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Idaho 824, 826 (2004) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301). According to the Idaho
Supreme Court, the constitutional protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause
are properly focused on the elements of the offense, not the composite acts underlying
the offense.

McCormick 100 Idaho at 114; State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1099

(1987); see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 (rejecting Ohio's assertion to the contrary).
Nonetheless, the State has requested this Court focus its Blockburger analysis
on the composite acts underlying Mr. Moffat's offense. (Resp. Br. at 8-13.) Under a
proper Blockburger analysis, the second prosecution for attempted strangulation
violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double
jeopardy.

The focus of the "statutory test" is on the statutes themselves, not the

composite actions underlying the offenses: "An offense will be deemed to be a lesser
included offense of another, greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a

conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the elements of the greater
offense.,,6 McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114 (emphasis added) (focusing its examination for
double jeopardy issues on the elements required for conviction under I.C. § 18-1401
and I.C. § 18-6101, not on the composite actions); see also Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1100-

punishment for the same course of conduct, but rather, gave the State a separate
avenue to pursue a single conviction for that course of conduct when a certain factual
scenario unfolded. Therefore, the Hunter limitation does not apply to these statutes and
Blockburgerforbids the second prosecution, as there is no bilateral uniqueness.
6 The State only supports its arguments with interpretations of this rule from Illinois,
Texas, New York, and Indiana. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Under the rule of stare decisis,
however, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on point is controlling and the question
should be deemed settled. Scott v. Gossett, 66 Idaho 329, 335 (1945); see Houghland
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 78 (1990) (noting potential exceptions for
extreme circumstances). In Idaho, courts focus on the elements of the statutes in
question to determine if double jeopardy apples. McCormick, 110 Idaho at 114; Sterley,
112 Idaho at 1099; see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 169.

11

01 (applying the rule from McCormick); State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611 (Ct. App.
1989)7 (applying the Blockburger test by examining "the statutory elements" of
manufacturing a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance, finding
bilateral uniqueness. Id. at 615 (emphasis added)).
In this case, the two statutes in question are I.C. § 18-923(1) (attempted
strangulation) and I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) (misdemeanor domestic battery).

As fully

explained in the Appellant's Brief (incorporated herein by reference thereto), the two
statutes lack the necessary bilateral uniqueness to survive a proper analysis under

Blockburger and McCormick. (See App. Br., pp.11-16.) As the State admitted in the
Respondent's Brief that "attempting to strangle a person may encompass a battery ... "
(Resp. Br., p.9), there is no need to reiterate that argument herein.

The State has

conceded the point - there is no bilateral uniqueness between attempted strangulation
and misdemeanor domestic battery, particularly as they were applied in this case, and
therefore, the second prosecution in this case (for attempted strangulation) violated
Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy.

7 The subsequent history from the Court of Appeals' decision in Randles is somewhat
convoluted. The Idaho Supreme Court subsequently affirmed in part and reversed in
part the Court of Appeals' decision in Randles, 115 Idaho 611; it did not, however, reach
the question of double jeopardy or multiple punishments. Randles, 117 Idaho 334, 346
(1990). However, the Idaho Supreme Court subsequently overruled its decision in
Randles, 117 Idaho 334, which had been premised on State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129
(1979) (specifically speaking to the proper jury instructions to be given when a case was
premised on only circumstantial evidence). State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657,
661-62. However, the only analysis relevant to the issues now on appeal is the analysis
from Court of Appeals' decision in Randles regarding whether there was a violation of
the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same course of conduct, analysis
which was not reversed by the Idaho Supreme Court and which was not disturbed by
the Humphreys decision. The relevant analysis will be referred to hereinafter as
"Randles."
12

As such, the only question remaining is whether Mr. Moffat's actions were
sufficiently separate from one another so as to make them separate events or courses
of conduct. Compare Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301 (holding that, because the sales of
controlled substances were made at different times (though one immediately after the
other) for different payments, based on different impetuses to make a deal, the
composite acts were separate events) McCormick, 110 Idaho at 114-15 (holding that,
because the required acts for each of the offenses charged were not the same
(breaking and entering with the necessary intent, as opposed to an act of sexual
intercourse under certain circumstances), the acts constituted different, separate
events); Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097 (holding that, because the conspiracy charge
encompassed the delivery aspect of a narcotics transaction, even though the composite
acts of the conspiracy occurred at different times than those underlying delivery, they
were part of a single course of conduct and could not be charged separately). Simply
put, "the [Idaho] Supreme Court also has held that a general transaction or series of
events may be treated as several separate acts if the acts are distinguishable."

Randles, 115 Idaho at 615 (emphasis added) (citing McCormick, 100 Idaho 111). Yet,
the Randles Court noted that "the question is a close one" when asked to consider
whether dual prosecutions for manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver were
part of a single course of conduct when the defendant was growing marijuana,
harvesting it, and storing it because "there was no single point in time when all
cultivation and harvesting stopped, and all stockpiling of processed marijuana began."
Id. at 616. The Court determined that the tipping mechanism was based on the point in
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time each act occurred and the amount of overlap between the composite acts. Id. at
615-16.
That is consistent with the test, at least for the by-gone I.C. § 18-301 (which
codified the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same action, but which was
repealed in 1995), which was temporal, requiring the first act to be complete before the
second act began. Randles, 115 Idaho at 615. Here, as the officer, the victim, and an
independent witness testified, the acts were occurring at the same time. Because the
separate charging documents cover events which are substantially overlapped,
occurring at one temporal moment, they cannot appropriately be separated into their
isolated acts and survive the protections against double jeopardy.
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301-03; Randles, 115 Idaho at 615-16.

See, e.g.,

Thus, under a

temporal analysis, they cannot be separated into individual acts, and therefore, the dual
prosecutions violate the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
In this case, as discussed in Section (B) supra, the series of events in this case is
not distinguishable - the composite acts overlap to the point that they are not temporally
separated.

See, e.g., (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1, p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9; PSI, p.2; Prelim.

Tr., p.12.) Mr. Moffat's acts were simultaneous, occurring at the same time pursuant to
a single impulse. 8 (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1, p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9.) As such, Mr. Moffat's
actions constituted
punishments.

a "continuous 'act'"

and

cannot be subjected to multiple

See, e.g., Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 569.

Therefore, as Mr. Moffat's

composite actions from May 9, 2010, cannot be distinguished from one another, they

Where the acts are committed pursuant to the same impulse and at the same time,
they are part of a continuous act, and thus, cannot be prosecuted separately.
Blo ckb urger, 284 U.S. at 301-03.
8
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are but a single course of conduct, and the second prosecution for that course of
conduct (attempted strangulation) is unconstitutional.

See Randles, 115 Idaho at

615-16; Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097; see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301; McCormick,

110 Idaho at 114-15.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Moffat respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction for
attempted strangulation.
DATED this 2ih day of September, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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